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DISTRICT COURTS, FAIR USE, AND LITERARY PARODIES: 
PARSING THE BEAUTIFUL, RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT 
Brigitte Radigan Gladis∗ 
Among other things, you’ll find that you’re not the first person 
who was ever confused and frightened and even sickened by hu-
man behavior.  You’re by no means alone on that score, you’ll be 
excited and stimulated to know.  Many, many men have been just 
as troubled morally and spiritually as you are right now.  Happily, 
some of them kept records of their troubles.  You’ll learn from 
them—if you want to.  Just as someday, if you have something to 
offer, someone will learn something from you.  It’s a beautiful, re-
ciprocal arrangement.  And it isn’t education.  It’s history.  It’s 
poetry.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Authors have long sought to contribute to this “beautiful, reci-
procal arrangement” by creating original works of scholarship, often 
in response to other writers troubled by the same moral and spiritual 
dilemmas.  Copyright has somewhat complicated this arrangement by 
deeming some references to another’s work to be violative of that au-
thor’s rights to his original.  Congress has tried to strike a delicate 
balance between the rights of an original author to his creation and 
the right to contribute to the “marketplace of ideas” guaranteed to 
the public by the First Amendment.
2
  To do so, it codified the judicial 
fair use doctrine and vested district courts with the discretion to de-
termine when uses have crossed the line from fair use to infringe-
ment.
3
  The lack of precision in where courts should draw the line, 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A., 2007, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2005, Rutgers University.  I would like to thank Professor 
David Opderbeck for his advice and Sarah Geers for her thoughtful remarks about 
this Comment. 
 1 J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 246 (1951). 
 2 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the 
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”). 
 3 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (codifying the judicial doctrine of fair use). 
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however, sometimes leads courts to prioritize one set of rights over 
the other, resulting in uncertainty and unpredictability. 
In the United States, the use of copyright to protect one’s eco-
nomic interest in artistic creation derives from the British Statute of 
Anne, which Parliament passed in 1710 to prevent publishers from 
publishing books without the original author’s consent.
4
  The Statute 
of Anne gave economic rights to authors of books, but it also limited 
these rights by restricting the copyright to printing and reprinting 
copies of that book.
5
  In addition, the term of the copyright was li-
mited to fourteen years.
6
  Following the Revolution, the fledgling 
United States incorporated the limitations on copyright from the Sta-
tute of Anne in an early resolution of the Continental Congress
7
 and 
later used this tradition in the formation of the United States Consti-
tution’s Copyright Clause.
8
 
Modern copyright protection in the United States is found in 
the Copyright Act of 1976, specifically 17 U.S.C. § 102, which explicit-
ly allows for copyrights over particular modes of expression, such as 
 
 4 See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp (“Whereas printers, book-
sellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, re-
printing, and publishing . . . books and other writings, without the consent of the au-
thors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their very great detriment . . . .”); 
see also Tracey Topper Gonzales, Note, Distinguishing the Derivative from the Transforma-
tive: Expanding Market-Based Inquiries in Fair Use Adjudications, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 229, 232 (2003). 
 5 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (stating that the title of the statute 
is “[a]n act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed 
books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein men-
tioned”). 
 6 Id. (“That the author of any book or books already composed, and not printed 
and published, or that shall hereafter be composed, his assignee or assigns, shall 
have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such book and books for the term of 
fourteen years, to commence from the day of first publishing the same, and no long-
er.”); see also Diane Kilpatrick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law: Preventing a Clear Danger to 
the U.S. Economy or Clearly Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 91 (2005). 
 7 Journal of the United States in Congress Assembled, Containing the Proceed-
ings from Nov. 1782 to Nov. 1783, at 256–57 (Philadelphia, C.D. Claypoole, 1783), 
available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/Resolution% 
20of%20the%20Continental%20Congress%20Respecting%20Copyright.pdf (“That 
it be recommended to the several States, to secure to the authors or publishers of any 
new books not hitherto printed . . . the copyright of such books for a certain time not 
less than fourteen years from the first publication . . . .”). 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that one of the powers of Congress is “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discove-
ries”); see also Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Essay, Copyright in 1791: An Essay, 52 
EMORY L.J. 909, 931–38 (2003). 
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literary works, musical works, and visual works.
9
  The statute also vests 
artists and authors with the right to reproduce their original work, as 
well as the right to create derivative works from their originals.
10
  Ul-
timately, copyright protection serves to encourage artists and authors 
to create original works for the benefit of the public welfare;
11
 allow-
ing them a monopoly over these creations incentivizes the process.
12
  
The protection, however, is statutorily limited; Congress specified 
that protection extends only to “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.”
13
  The statute further limits cop-
yright protection by disallowing copyrights over “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery.”
14
  Thus, Congress emphasized the limited nature of copyright 
protection by explicitly drawing a line between ideas and actual ex-
pression of those ideas. 
The idea/expression dichotomy embodied in the statute ensures 
some measure of First Amendment protection while still preserving 
an author’s limited monopoly over his expression.
15
  Not all elements 
of a given work will always be copyrightable; for this reason, whether 
someone has infringed another’s copyright will first depend upon a 
court’s characterization of an author’s or artist’s work as protectable 
expression rather than merely an idea, which cannot generally be co-
pyrighted.
16
  Ultimately, the idea/expression dichotomy serves to pre-
vent someone from “stifling public debate by maintaining a monopo-
 
 9 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
 10 Id. § 106.   
 11 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general 
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”). 
 12 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright sup-
plies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); United States v. Pa-
ramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright law, like the patent 
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); see also Kilpatrick-
Lee, supra note 6, at 94.   
 13 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 14 § 102(b).   
 15 See Barbara S. Murphy, Comment, The Wind Done Gone: Parody or Piracy? A 
Comment on Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 567, 
573 (2002). 
 16 See Jonathan S. Katz, Expanded Notions of Copyright Protection: Idea Protection With-
in the Copyright Act, 77 B.U. L. REV. 873, 878–79 (1997). 
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ly on historical fact or bare ideas.”
17
  Nevertheless, the boundary be-
tween what is just an idea and what constitutes copyrightable expres-
sion is a difficult one to fix with any precision.  As Judge Learned 
Hand once commented, “Nobody has ever been able to fix that 
boundary, and nobody ever can.”
18
  Thus, although the 
idea/expression boundary is intended to protect important First 
Amendment concerns, it is not always able to do so, nor does it create 
clear guidelines for creators and producers to follow.
19
 
U.S. copyright law, as opposed to the law in many European 
countries, is further limited in that U.S. law does not generally expli-
citly recognize an author’s moral rights to his creation.
20
  “Moral 
rights,” a doctrine originally established in France, embodies the idea 
that an author possesses more than merely economic rights in his or 
her creation.
21
  Such rights include “the right to prevent others from 
being named as the author of his work” as well as “the right to pre-
vent others from making deforming changes in his work.”
22
  The 
Berne Convention, signed by several countries, codified these rights 
more broadly to protect authors’ non-economic rights, primarily 
rights to attribution and integrity.
23
  In the United States, explicit sta-
tutory protection of moral rights extends only to works of visual art 
rather than to literary or musical works.
24
  Further, “Congress made 
clear its antipathy to the expansion of copyright law to embrace gen-
 
 17 Tiffany D. Trunko, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amend-
ment, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1949 (1989). 
 18 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).   
 19 In cases of literary works, the idea/expression dichotomy becomes relevant in 
a discussion of whether a character or storyline is copyrightable expression rather 
than merely an idea.  Generally, literary characters are considered copyrightable to 
the extent that they are well developed in the fictional story in which they appear.  
See id. (“It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copy-
righted; that is the penalty an author must bear for making them too indistinctly.”); 
see also Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The 
Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992). 
 20 See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copy-
right law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of 
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than 
the personal, rights of authors.”). 
 21 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 (2009). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/ 
berne/6bis.html. 
 24 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006).  “Only the author 
of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, wheth-
er or not that author is the copyright owner.”  Id. § 106A(b). 
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eral moral rights.”
25
  The lack of explicit statutory protection for the 
moral rights of authors underscores Congress’s protection of the 
“marketplace of ideas” and furthers the progress of science and the 
arts protected by the U.S. Constitution.
26
 
In addition to the idea/expression dichotomy and the general 
lack of protection for moral rights, Congress has also limited copy-
right protection in its statutory embodiment of the judicially created 
fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Section 107 allows for “infringe-
ment” of copyrights, so long as that infringement is for a legitimate 
purpose.  Legitimate purposes include, but are not limited to, “criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”
27
  To determine wheth-
er a work qualifies as fair use, courts apply four factors to the work in 
question.
28
 
Courts first address “the purpose and character of the use, in-
cluding whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprof-
it educational purposes.”
29
  This first factor tends to assess how trans-
formative a work is when compared to the original.
30
  To be 
considered transformative, “[t]he use must be productive and must 
employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different 
purpose from the original.”
31
 
The second factor courts consider in analyzing fair use is “the 
nature of the copyrighted work.”
32
  This factor “recognizes that there 
is a hierarchy of copyright protection in which original, creative 
works are afforded greater protection than derivative works or factual 
compilations.”
33
 
The third fair use factor assesses “the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”
34
  
This factor has both quantitative and qualitative elements.
35
  The ap-
 
 25 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 8D.06. 
 26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 28 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
 29 § 107(1). 
 30 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 31 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 
(1990). 
 32 § 107(2).   
 33 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001); 
see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (“In general, fair use is more likely 
to be found in factual works than in fictional novels.”). 
 34 § 107(3).   
 35 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05(A)(3). 
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propriate quantity of material that may be taken ultimately depends 
on the purpose the new work is intended to serve, while the quality of 
the material that is used relates to whether the new work appropriates 
the “heart of the work,” or material that may interfere with the mar-
ket of the original.
36
 
Finally, under the fourth factor, courts consider “the effect of 
the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work.”
37
  
“The fourth factor disfavors a finding of fair use only when the mar-
ket is impaired because the quoted material serves the consumer as a 
substitute, or, in [Justice] Story’s words ‘supersede[s] the use of the 
original.’”
38
  Once a court evaluates each individual factor, it will 
weigh the factors to determine whether a use tips in favor of or 
against fair use.
39
 
Although the four factors apply in every case in which a court 
analyzes fair use, the subjectivity built into the test allows judges the 
discretion to look at each case individually rather than to rely on 
bright-line rules.
40
  Because the fair use doctrine is “an equitable rule 
of reason,” Congress did not want to solidify a definition that could 
be applied to all situations; instead, Congress included in the statute 
criteria that had evolved over time through judicial decisions.
41
  Fur-
ther, Congress made clear that codifying the fair use factors did not 
serve to change, narrow, or enlarge the previous judicial doctrine and 
that the factors are illustrative, not exhaustive, of what courts should 
consider.
42
  In codifying this fair use doctrine, Congress emphasized 
that “the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situa-
tions on a case-by-case basis.”
43
  Additionally, the fundamental pur-
pose of copyright is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
44
  The fair 
 
 36 Leval, supra note 31, at 1122–23. 
 37 § 107(4).   
 38 Leval, supra note 31, at 1125 (quoting Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)). 
 39 See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 40 See Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and Mar-
kets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 591 (2002). 
 41 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).  
 42 Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1168 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 43 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
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use doctrine furthers this goal by allowing authors and artists to trans-
form existing works for some creative, original purpose.
45
 
Justice Story once stated, 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, 
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and 
original throughout.  Every book in literature, science and art, 
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was 
well known and used before.
46
 
This Comment will address district courts’ application of the four fair 
use factors to asserted cases of parody, most specifically in the context 
of parodic sequels to literary novels, to determine whether these 
court decisions adequately protect the First Amendment rights of the 
authors of these sequels. 
Part II of this Comment discusses how courts have applied the 
fair use factors to parody in various forms of media and confronts the 
differences in analysis that may result depending upon which mode 
of expression is being studied.  Part III discusses the different types of 
relief afforded depending on the form of expression the parody 
takes.  Parts IV and V analyze two recent district court decisions that 
involved parodic sequels and discuss how the courts applied the fair 
use factors to reach their decisions about injunctive relief.  Finally, 
Part VI discusses several possible solutions to the problem of “arbi-
trary” district court application of the fair use factors in this context. 
II. FAIR USE AND PARODIES IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF MEDIA 
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court 
made explicit that parody could fall within the purview of the fair use 
doctrine.
47
  In Campbell, the Court analyzed rap group 2 Live Crew’s 
use of the title, opening bass riff, and one verse of Roy Orbison’s song 
“Oh, Pretty Woman” in its own rap “parody.”
48
  The Court first de-
termined that the factors outlined in the Copyright Act were not ex-
haustive and should be considered in terms of all of the facts of a par-
ticular case; the statute essentially creates “general guidance” to 
courts, but courts are not limited to the examples listed in the sta-
tute.
49
  The Court next commented that the “goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation 
 
 45 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1994).   
 46 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436). 
 47 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).   
 48 See Murphy, supra note 15, at 578.   
 49 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
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of transformative works.”
50
  For this reason, those who transform 
another’s work through the use of parody are able to claim fair use, 
much in the way others who comment and criticize do.
51
  Finally, the 
Court cautioned that courts should be careful in applying factor four, 
which considers the effect on the market for the copyrighted work.
52
  
Parodies will seldom become market substitutes for the original, 
which is what factor four is designed to prevent.
53
  Factor four, there-
fore, should not be applied to consider the potential economic ef-
fects from a parody’s negative depiction of a given work.
54
 
Campbell thus created a broad standard for how district courts 
should approach the fair use doctrine in the context of parody.  
Therefore, in cases in which the creator of a derivative work is assert-
ing a defense of fair use on the grounds of parody, courts must, as a 
threshold matter, determine whether such parody exists.
55
  Even if a 
court finds the work to be a parody, a finding of fair use is not guar-
anteed; the court must then apply the other factors to determine 
whether the balance tips in favor of or against fair use.
56
  In their ana-
lyses, courts will first attempt to distinguish between parody and sa-
tire; while parody requires some appropriation from another work to 
be able to criticize or comment on it, a satire stands alone and does 
not need to use another’s material in the same way that a parody 
would because a satire comments on something unrelated to the orig-
inal.
57
  Thus, if a court determines a writing to be a satire rather than 
a parody, the author will have less of a reason to appropriate work 
from another source because his satire should be able to stand on its 
own.  To make this determination, a court will consider whether “a 
parodic character may reasonably be perceived”
58
 in the new work; if 
so, the court will consider it a parody.
59
 
Following Campbell, another difficulty courts face in discerning 
parody is the inconsistent application of the term “parody.”  The 
 
 50 Id. at 579. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. at 591. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 591–92 (“We do not, of course, suggest that a parody may not harm the 
market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand 
for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”). 
 55 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
 56 Leval, supra note 31, at 1111. 
 57 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81.   
 58 Id. at 582.   
 59 Id. 
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Campbell Court determined that for the purpose of the Copyright Act, 
parody consists of “the use of some elements of a prior author’s com-
position to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that 
author’s work.”
60
  Further, “a work [does] not have to advertise itself 
as a parody” because the same creative goals would be served with or 
without a label.
61
  Some confusion also lies in whether a parody is re-
quired to be humorous in making its point.  A traditional definition 
of parody is “a literary or musical work in which the style of an author 
or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule.”
62
  But the 
legal definition of parody makes no reference to humor; instead, as 
Campbell makes clear, a work must merely comment on the original 
through incorporation of material from the original to qualify as a 
parody.
63
  This definition, however, has not prevented some courts 
from assessing the level of humor found in a given work to determine 
whether or not it should qualify for the fair use defense as a parody.
64
 
Since Campbell, the circuits have defined parody both narrowly 
and broadly, reaching seemingly divergent results.
65
  For example, in 
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
held that a book that used stylistic and artistic elements from Dr. 
Seuss books to “parody” the O.J. Simpson murder trial did not consti-
tute fair use because the author made “no effort to create a transfor-
mative work.”
66
  Although in this case “a parodic character may be 
 
 60 Id. at 580.   
 61 Jonathan M. Fox, The Fair Use Commercial Parody Defense and How to Improve It, 46 
IDEA 619, 626 (2006). 
 62 Parody – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/parody (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 63 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580; see also Fox, supra note 61, at 619–20. 
 64 See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 
2009) (“Although we recognize some humor in ‘Char’ bucks as a reference to the 
dark roast of the Starbucks coffees, Black Bear’s claim of humor fails to demonstrate 
such a clear parody as to qualify . . . .”); Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There are confusing parodies and non-
confusing parodies.  All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the 
use of someone else’s trademark.”); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This stems from [the] fact that pa-
rody’s humor ‘necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through 
distorted imitation.’” (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588)); Suntrust Bank v. Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1373 n.11 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“Parody is a term 
that implies wit and humor, neither of which is in evidence here.”), rev’d, 268 F.3d 
1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 65 See Fox, supra note 61, at 628–29.   
 66 109 F.3d 1394, 1401  (9th Cir. 1997) (“Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does 
broadly mimic Dr. Seuss’ characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridi-
cule.”).  But see Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) 
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reasonably perceived,” the court applied this standard narrowly and 
rejected the defendant’s fair use defense.
67
  This case highlights that 
the difficulty with applying the fair use factors to works with parodic 
purposes, as opposed to those with scholarly or research purposes, is 
that “judges can ‘manipulate’ the flexible statutory fair use factors to 
effectively censor parodies ‘because they [find] them immoral or per-
sonally distasteful.’”
68
  Whether this “manipulation” is intentional may 
be debatable, but the flexible standard does establish the basis for it 
to occur.
69
  The Campbell court, however, cautioned that 
“[w]hether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and should 
not matter to fair use.”
70
  This does not change the fact that, across 
jurisdictions, would-be parodists cannot know what to expect because 
court decisions are often unpredictable both in the way they draw the 
parody/satire distinction and in their determination of whether the 
parody can only comment on the original work or can use the origi-
nal to comment on a broader issue.
71
 
Courts also seem to differ in their interpretations of whether the 
use of copyrighted material in parodying matters other than the co-
pyrighted material can qualify as fair use.  This question of scope may 
arise if an author of a parodic sequel uses material from the original 
work to comment not only on the work but also on an issue loosely 
related to the work.
72
  In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting 
Co., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
found that even if a parody “did not parody the plaintiff’s song itself, 
that finding would not preclude a finding of fair use.”
73
  In Elsmere, 
the court addressed Saturday Night Live’s (SNL’s) use of Elsmere’s 
copyrighted song “I Love New York” in a parody entitled “I Love So-
 
(holding that because a movie poster that used material from a professional photo-
graph could “reasonably be perceived as” a parody, it could be considered fair use). 
 67 Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403. 
 68 Murphy, supra note 15, at 578.   
 69 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 21, § 13.05(A)(5)(a) (“Accordingly, courts 
weigh the factors the way they deem best in individual cases.  The result, unfortu-
nately, is often that the four factors fail to drive the analysis, but rather serve as con-
venient pegs on which to hang antecedent conclusions.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 70 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994).   
 71 See Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of 
Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465, 474 (1992). 
 72 See infra Parts IV, V (discussing two cases of parodic sequels; one commented 
on the original novel and the depiction of African-American slaves during the Re-
construction era, and the other commented on the original novel and its relation-
ship with the novel’s author). 
 73 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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dom.”
74
  Elsmere argued that SNL did not use the song to parody the 
song itself, but rather to comment on New York City’s problems in 
general.
75
  The court determined that “the issue to be resolved by a 
court is whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody, and 
not whether it is a parody of the copied song itself.”
76
 
Similarly, in M.C.A., Inc. v. Wilson, the Second Circuit found that 
“a permissible parody need not be directed solely to the copyrighted 
song but may also reflect on life in general.  However, if the copy-
righted song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no 
need to conjure it up.”
77
  Further, in Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., the Southern District of New York addressed a claim 
that the defendant’s creation of a song entitled “I Need a Jew” in-
fringed on the plaintiff’s copyright of the song “When You Wish upon 
a Star.”
78
  The plaintiff claimed that the use constituted copyright in-
fringement because the song “I Need a Jew” did not parody the song 
“When You Wish upon a Star,” but rather commented on racism and 
bigotry in general.
79
  The court held that “[t]he song can be ‘reason-
ably perceived’ to be commenting that any categorical view of a race 
of people is childish and simplistic, just like wishing upon a star.”
80
  In 
addition, the court said that the defendants “were clearly attempting 
to comment in some way on the wishful, hopeful scene in Pinocchio 
with which the song is associated.”
81
  In contrast, in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc., the court 
held that “[t]he concept or form of parody which justifies protection 
under the copyright law, and exemption from liability for infringe-
ment, consists of an original expression which has social value by 
 
 74 Id. at 744. 
 75 Id. at 745. Although this case was decided more than a decade before Campbell, 
Campbell explained that “[a] parody that more loosely targets an original than the 
parody presented here may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come 
within our analysis of parody.”  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 
n.14 (1994).  This footnote leaves the door open for courts to weigh more or less 
heavily whether the parody comments on the original or on another issue depending 
on whether the other fair use factors tip for or against fair use.  Id.  For this reason, 
Elsmere and similar decisions are still cited by courts agreeing with this proposition.  
See, e.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 76 Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 746.   
 77 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 78 602 F. Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 79 Id. at 506. 
 80 Id.    
 81 Id. at 507 (italics added). 
RADIGAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  3:05 PM 
1180 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1169 
commenting upon the work being parodied.”
82
  The uncertainty as to 
the extent of the legal definition of parody may be the difference be-
tween a finding of fair use and a finding of infringement.  Those who 
choose to comment on society or on a given work through the use of 
parody should know the boundaries of this form of expression and 
should be aware of the potential future legal battle before the work is 
published rather than afterward. 
The approach to the fair use factors that a court uses in a given 
case often depends upon which mode of expression the derivative 
work employs.  In cases of literary infringement, courts will excerpt 
passages from both works and draw qualitative comparisons.
83
  When 
courts are analyzing musical or other nonliterary works, however, 
they will often attempt to assess potential infringement in terms of 
quantity of material appropriated from an original.
84
  A quantitative 
analysis is more objective and poses less of a risk of “judicial manipu-
lation” of the fair use factors than does a subjective qualitative analy-
sis.  For this reason, the First Amendment rights of literary parodists 
are put in a more perilous position than those of their musical or 
even visual counterparts.  This is most evident when courts use in-
junctive relief in cases of literary parody. 
III. DISTRICT COURTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Many scholars believe that issuing preliminary injunctions in 
copyright cases implicates concerns of prior restraint of an author’s 
First Amendment rights.
85
  As Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh have 
noted, “[p]reliminary injunctions in copyright cases—and in certain 
other types of intellectual property cases—are at least as troublesome 
as preliminary injunctions in obscenity or libel cases.  We believe that 
under the Court’s prior restraint jurisprudence many intellectual 
 
 82 No. C79-1766A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15976 at *4–5 (N.D. Ga. August 26, 
1981). 
 83 See infra Parts IV, V. 
 84 See Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., No. 
C 07-6076 SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60545, at *19–21 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (dis-
cussing the amount of time appropriated from a radio program for a commentary on 
the program’s message and determining that the amount of time taken was reasona-
bly necessary to the commentary); see also Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. 
Supp. 2d 310, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the fact that because fifteen 
seconds of a song were used in a movie, the “amount and substantiality” factor tipped 
in favor of defendant). 
 85 See, e.g., Trunko, supra note 17, at 1942 (“First amendment issues arise in copy-
right cases because enjoining publication of a book upon finding infringement may 
abridge the alleged infringer’s right to freedom of speech.  Yet prior restraints in the 
form of injunctions are routinely available in copyright cases.”). 
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property preliminary injunctions are therefore unconstitutional.”
86
  
This is true especially in light of the fact that artists and authors filing 
copyright-infringement suits may seek a variety of relief, including in-
junctions, impoundments, damages or profits, and costs and attorney 
fees.
87
  Under 17 U.S.C. § 502, a court with jurisdiction to hear copy-
right actions has the ability to grant injunctive relief “on such terms 
as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a 
copyright.”
88
  Plaintiffs in copyright-infringement suits tend to favor 
injunctive relief because it prevents infringers of the copyright from 
further marketing and distributing a work or a product that interferes 
with the economic viability of the original.
89
  Injunctive relief, howev-
er, may serve to repress elements of original expression found along-
side “infringing” material in a given work, which presents the prob-
lem of restraint of free speech.
90
 
Although courts dealing with other substantive issues will gener-
ally apply a four-factor test to establish whether injunctive relief is ap-
propriate in a given case, these courts tend to treat plaintiffs in copy-
right cases more favorably and ease the standard.
91
  In non-copyright 
cases, courts will address (1) whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed 
on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if 
the injunction is not granted; (3) whether the balance of hardships 
tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) whether granting the injunction 
would be in the public interest.
92
  In copyright-infringement cases, 
 
 86 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 241 (1998). 
 87 17 U.S.C. § 502–505 (2006). 
 88 § 502(a). 
 89 See Andrew F. Spillane, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 283–85 (2011). 
 90 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994).  In 
Campbell, the Supreme Court noted that  
[b]ecause the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of judg-
ment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases involving paro-
dies (or other critical works), courts may also wish to bear in mind that 
the goals of the copyright law, “to stimulate the creation and publica-
tion of edifying matter,” . . . are not always best served by automatically 
granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone 
beyond the bounds of fair use.  
Id. (quoting Leval, supra note 31, at 1132); see also Trunko, supra note 17, at 1950 
(“Courts tend to suspect that quotation is stealing and that moral opprobrium at-
taches to the act of derivative use, forgetting that all intellectual activity is in part de-
rivative and that certain intellectual endeavors such as criticism or history are expli-
citly referential.”). 
 91 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 86, at 158. 
 92 Id. 
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however, this factor analysis often collapses into a discussion of the 
plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, because irreparable 
harm to the original author is presumed.
93
  In fact, all circuits except 
the Fifth Circuit “hold that when a plaintiff in a copyright case de-
monstrates a likelihood of success on the merits . . . the district court 
must presume that the remedies at law would be inadequate.”
94
 
Although the readiness to issue preliminary injunctions does not 
conflict with First Amendment free speech issues in cases of outright 
piracy of an original work, this partiality may prove problematic in 
other cases because parties will often bring copyright-infringement 
claims against works that do have significant transformative value.
95
  
Further, whether the creator of a derivative work will be successful in 
an asserted fair use defense “depends on widely varying perceptions 
held by different judges.”
96
  In many copyright cases in which a court 
awards a party injunctive relief, “the copyright owner’s interest may 
be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever in-
fringement is found.”
97
  In the context of unauthorized literary se-
quels, district courts seem to end up analyzing the merit of the se-
quel, or the quality of the writing, instead of determining how the 
sequel may affect the copyright-holder’s rights to his or her original 
or to derivatives of the original.
98
  Two recent district court cases in-
volving such literary sequels, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Compa-
ny
99
 and Salinger v. Colting,
100
 serve to illustrate this tendency. 
 
 93 See Country Kids ‘N City Slicks v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he prevailing view in cases of copyright infringement [is] that a showing of like-
lihood of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm.”); Lemley 
& Volokh, supra note 86, at 159 (“If the copyright owner demonstrates a likelihood of 
success, courts are virtually unanimous in dispensing with the need to show irrepara-
ble injury.”). 
 94 H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions 
and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (2008); see, 
e.g., Cadence Design Sys. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A copy-
right infringement defendant cannot rebut the presumption of irreparable harm by 
showing that money damages are adequate.”). 
 95 See, for example, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company and Salinger v. Colt-
ing, discussed infra in Parts IV and V. 
 96 Leval, supra note 31, at 1132. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See infra Parts IV, V. 
 99 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 100 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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IV. SUNTRUST BANK V. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
Plaintiff Suntrust Bank filed suit against Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant 
from distributing The Wind Done Gone by Alice Randall (“Randall’s 
novel”), a sequel to Gone with the Wind (“GWTW”) that the plaintiff 
claimed interfered with its copyright.
101
  Randall’s novel retells the 
story of GWTW from the point of view of Cynara, a slave and the 
daughter of Mammy, a character in GWTW.
102
  The defendant 
claimed that the reason for the direct, explicit, and repeated refer-
ences to GWTW was to critique GWTW’s negative depiction of Afri-
can-Americans.
103
  The court began its analysis by emphasizing that, 
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), authors of original works have the exclu-
sive right to create derivative works.
104
  Furthermore, the plaintiff had 
already created several sequels to the original novel; the plaintiff 
therefore argued that further publication and distribution of Ran-
dall’s novel would ultimately destroy the market for these products.
105
 
After establishing that Randall’s novel contained “actionable co-
pying,” the court addressed the defendant’s fair use claim and found 
that the novel did not constitute a “fair use” of the material taken 
from GWTW.
106
  To draw this conclusion, the court applied the four 
fair use factors under § 107.
107
  First, the court analyzed the transfor-
mative value of Randall’s novel to determine whether “the purpose 
and character” of the use weighed in favor of a fair use finding.
108
  
This determination necessitated that the court analyze how the as-
pects taken from GWTW were integrated in the new novel and “what 
the author attempt[ed] to accomplish by creating her new work 
through the copying of the original expression of another artist.”
109
  
The court eventually conceded that Randall’s novel contained some 
parodic elements and was therefore at least a little transformative, but 
its overall purpose was not solely to comment on or to criticize the 
original, and therefore, the book was viewed as an unauthorized se-
quel.
110
  Essentially, the court determined that “the new work does not 
 
 101 Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1364. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1367.  
 104 Id. at 1365.   
 105 Id. at 1363–64. 
 106 Id. at 1386.   
 107 See discussion supra accompanying notes 28–39. 
 108 Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.  
 109 Id. at 1374.   
 110 Id. at 1377–78.   
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make use of a hero, but, rather, takes fifteen main characters, more 
fully explains what happened in the previous work, and then tells 
what happens to them thereafter—a sequel.”
111
  The court explained 
that because an authorized sequel to GWTW could accomplish the 
same effect as Randall’s novel, albeit in a different writing style, Ran-
dall’s novel was not sufficiently transformative to be considered fair 
use.
112
 
Next, the district court briefly concluded that because GWTW is 
a fictional novel and “is creative, imaginative, and written to gain a fi-
nancial return for the author’s efforts,” it deserves greater protection 
under a fair use analysis than would a scholarly work.
113
  Factor two 
therefore weighed against fair use.
114
  In terms of the third fair use 
factor—the amount and substantiality of the work used—the court 
found that Randall’s novel used too much material from GWTW to 
comment on GWTW’s “inaccurate portrait of Southern history.”
115
  
The court was not persuaded that Randall’s novel added sufficient 
new material and commentary to the original story to qualify for fair 
use.
116
  Specifically, the court remarked that “Ms. Randall’s use cannot 
receive the benefit of the fair use defense because she uses far more 
of the original than necessary.”
117
  In making this determination, 
however, the court did not define what amount would be “necessary” 
in order to make Randall’s point.  Instead, the court noted that Ran-
dall’s novel “could have copied significantly less of the memorable 
parts of the original” and would have been able to qualify for fair use 
as a parody.
118
 
Finally, the court assessed the fourth factor, the effect of the use 
on the market value of the original.  In this analysis, the court em-
phasized that it needed to address “not only . . . the extent of the new 
work’s potential market harm to the earlier work but also . . . the ef-
fect that would occur if that type of use became widespread.”
119
  Al-
though the transformative elements made the market effect on the 
original difficult to determine, the court found that Randall’s novel 
would ultimately interfere with the copyright-holder’s market for de-
 
 111 Id. at 1375. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1380.   
 114 Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.  
 115 Id. at 1380–81.   
 116 Id. at 1381. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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rivative works, and therefore this factor tipped against fair use.
120
  The 
court totaled its findings for all four factors to determine that the 
plaintiff had a cognizable copyright infringement claim and that the 
defendant’s asserted fair use defense would fail; the court thus 
granted the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
121
 
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s find-
ing that Randall’s novel infringed upon GWTW’s copyright.
122
  The 
Eleventh Circuit focused its analysis on whether or not the injunction 
was the appropriate form of relief in this case, but in order to do so, it 
needed to analyze both the merit of the copyright infringement claim 
as well as the defendant’s fair use defense.
123
  In its decision, the Ele-
venth Circuit discussed the history of copyright and focused on its 
protection of learning, the public domain, and the exclusive rights of 
the author that it provides.
124
  The court addressed each of the fair 
use factors as applied to Randall’s novel and found that factors one, 
three, and four arguably tipped in favor of fair use.
125
  In drawing its 
conclusion, the court noted that “the issuance of the injunction was 
at odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the cop-
yright law, acting as a prior restraint on speech because the public 
had not had access to Randall’s ideas or viewpoint in the form of ex-
pression that she chose.”
126
  Compared to the district court’s opinion, 
which dismissed Randall’s First Amendment claim in one paragraph, 
the Eleventh Circuit more readily recognized the need to analyze fair 
use in literary parodies through the First Amendment lens, which ul-
timately tipped the balance in favor of finding fair use. 
V. SALINGER V. COLTING 
In Salinger v. Colting, plaintiff J.D. Salinger filed a complaint 
against defendant Fredrik Colting, alleging copyright infringement 
and common law unfair competition; Salinger claimed that Colting’s 
novel, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye (“60 Years”), is derivative 
of his novel Catcher in the Rye (“Catcher”).
127
  In response, Colting ar-
 
 120 Id. at 1383.   
 121 Id. at 1384–86. 
 122 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g 
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
 123 Id. at 1260. 
 124 Id. at 1261–62. 
 125 Id. at 1271–76. 
 126 Id. at 1277. 
 127 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
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gued that even if his novel otherwise infringed upon Salinger’s copy-
right, the novel qualified for the fair use defense.
128
  In determining 
whether to award Salinger a preliminary injunction to prevent Colt-
ing from publishing 60 Years in the United States, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York applied the four fair use 
factors by comparing the material found in 60 Years with that of 
Catcher.
129
  To assess the “purpose and character of the use,” the court 
looked to the work’s transformative quality and determined whether 
the new work “merely supersede[s] the objects of the original crea-
tion . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or dif-
ferent character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message . . . .”
130
  The court said that a transformative use “is not strict-
ly required,” but can help guide the court in its evaluation of whether 
or not a work “advances knowledge and the progress of the arts.”
131
 
The court first analyzed whether 60 Years qualifies as a parody, 
“which may claim fair use under § 107.”
132
  The court also clarified 
that precedent had established that the parody characterization only 
extends to the elements of the work that criticize or comment on the 
original work rather than the author of the original work himself.
133
  
The court ultimately distinguished Suntrust by noting that 60 Years 
“contains no reasonably discernable rejoinder or specific criticism of 
any character or theme of Catcher,” which made it difficult to classify 
as a parody.
134
  In its analysis of the parodic qualities of 60 Years, the 
court excerpted long passages from both Catcher and 60 Years and at-
tempted to compare the language and themes of the novels to de-
termine if substantial similarities existed between the two. 
The court first analyzed the character of Holden Caulfield and 
compared it to Colting’s Mr. C.
135
  Much of the court’s language in 
this analysis indicates that to reach a conclusion, the court must act as 
a literary critic or at least engage in some form of literary analysis.
136
  
For example, the court pulled an entire paragraph of quotes from 
Catcher to present a general overview of Salinger’s Holden Caulfield 
 
 128 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (2006).   
 129 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
 130 Id. at 256 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994)).   
 131 Id.  
 132 Id.   
 133 Id. at 257.   
 134 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d. at 258. 
 135 Id.  
 136 See id. at 258–60.    
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character.
137
  Following these quotes, the court explained, “to the ex-
tent Colting and Defense experts contend that 60 Years is attempting 
to accentuate how Holden’s emotional growth would ultimately be 
stunted by his unwillingness to compromise his principles or engage 
with ‘the phonies,’ they were again simply rehashing one of the criti-
cal extant themes of Catcher.”
138
  Despite the fact that Colting ex-
plained his attempted comment on Catcher, the court instead inter-
preted 60 Years to merely reiterate the same themes Salinger had 
expounded upon years earlier.
139
 
The court then commented that while analyzing creative works, 
it should not rationalize all commercial derivative works as “post hoc” 
parodies.
140
  In a footnote, the court also noted that until the litiga-
tion began, Colting never asserted that 60 Years was to be construed 
as a parody or critique; rather, he characterized the book as a sequel 
to Catcher.
141
  The court then addressed Colting’s argument that the 
inclusion of Salinger as a character in the novel was sufficiently trans-
formative to qualify 60 Years as a parody.
142
  The court did concede 
that using Salinger as a character in the novel was original, but held 
that a parody of a literary novel must comment on the work itself, not 
use the work to comment on something else, such as the author.
143
  
Further, the court explained that even if the Salinger character con-
tains transformative qualities, Colting included this character in the 
novel not to further a critique of the novel, but rather to comment on 
Salinger and “his supposed idiosyncrasies.”
144
 
 
 137 Id. at 258–59.  Following this overview, the court noted that “it can be argued 
that the contrast between Holden’s authentic but critical and rebellious nature and 
his tendency toward depressive alienation is one of the key themes of Catcher.”  Id. at 
259.  By making this statement, the court was interpreting the original novel in order 
to assess Colting’s novel in light of this interpretation, which seems to be a form of 
literary analysis and comparison. 
 138 Id. at 259–60. 
 139 In fact, the court later commented, “60 Years’ plain purpose is not to expose 
Holden Caulfield’s disconnectedness, absurdity, and ridiculousness, but rather to sa-
tisfy Holden’s fans’ passion for Holden Caulfield’s disconnectedness, absurdity, and 
ridiculousness, which Catcher has ‘elevated into the realm of protectable creative ex-
pression.’”  Id. (quoting Castle Rock Ent. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 143 
(2d Cir. 1998)). 
 140 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 260.  
 141 Id. at 260 n.3. 
 142 Id. at 262. 
 143 Id. at 261.  But see Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[T]he issue to be resolved by a court is whether the use in question 
is a valid satire or parody, and not whether it is a parody of the copied song itself.”). 
 144 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 262. 
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After analyzing whether 60 Years contained sufficient transfor-
mative elements and concluding that it did not, the court then ad-
dressed the other fair use factors, and determined that they also 
“weigh[ed] against a finding of fair use.”
145
  The district court held 
that because 60 Years was to be sold for profit, the commercial nature 
of the novel automatically weighed against finding fair use.
146
  Similar-
ly, in discussing the “nature of the copyrighted work,” the court ex-
plained that it accords more leeway to a fair use claim when the work 
is “factual or informational” rather than “expressive or creative.”
147
  
The court implied that because Colting chose to write a novel, fair 
use would be more difficult to establish.
148
  The court determined that 
in terms of the “amount and substantiality of the portion used,” Colt-
ing took “well more from Catcher, in both substance and style, than is 
necessary for the alleged transformative purpose of criticizing Salin-
ger and his attitudes and behavior.”
149
  In this analysis, the court again 
drew on particular language and excerpts from both novels to estab-
lish that Colting crossed the line.
150
  Echoing language used in the 
Suntrust district court opinion, the court in Salinger held that 
“[d]efendants have taken much more from Salinger’s copyrighted 
works than is necessary to serve their alleged critical purpose,”
151
 but 
did not give any guidance as to how much material would be “neces-
sary” to achieve that purpose. 
Finally, the district court determined that because it had pre-
viously characterized the novel as a sequel to Catcher, 60 Years falls 
within the purview of Salinger’s exclusive right to create derivative 
works and therefore interfered with the market for such derivative 
works.
152
  Because this novel may affect Salinger’s creation of a sequel 
to Catcher, the court held that this factor also weighed against fair 
use.
153
 
At the end of the opinion, the court briefly addressed the stan-
dard for injunctions.  After reaching its conclusion that Salinger es-
tablished a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the court de-
termined that “irreparable harm may be presumed,” and granted 
 
 145 Id. at 263. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id.  
 150 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
 151 Id. at 267. 
 152 Id. at 268. 
 153 Id. at 268. 
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Salinger the injunction.
154
  Colting appealed the decision, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and 
remanded the district court’s judgment.
155
  One of the major issues 
on appeal was the appropriateness of the district court’s issuance of 
an injunction.
156
  Several amicus curiae briefs were filed, and the fo-
cus of the briefs was largely on the First Amendment guarantee of 
free expression.
157
  Notable organizations such as the American Li-
brary Association used their briefs to emphasize the important First 
Amendment ramifications of the district court’s decision to issue the 
injunction,
158
 which indicated that this subject would become an im-
portant issue in the Second Circuit’s decision.  Ultimately, the court 
found that the preliminary injunction standard applied by the district 
court, which presumed irreparable harm once a copyright plaintiff 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, was partly abro-
gated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in eBay, Inc. v. MercEx-
change, L.L.C.
159
 
Although the eBay decision related to permanent injunctions in 
the patent context, the Second Circuit determined that eBay’s hold-
ing also applies in the context of preliminary injunctions in copyright 
actions.
160
  In eBay, the Supreme Court determined that principles of 
equity require plaintiffs to satisfy a four-part test before being granted 
injunctive relief: 
(1) that [plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that re-
medies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inade-
quate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the bal-
ance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy 
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not 
be disserved by a permanent injunction.
161
 
Because the district court in Salinger did not consider all of these fac-
tors in issuing its preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit re-
 
 154 Id. at 269.   
 155 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 156 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 25, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2010) (No. 09-2878); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 20, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 
(2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878). 
 157 See Brief of Am. Library Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellants at 3, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878) [herei-
nafter Brief of American Library Association], available at http://www.arl.org/ 
bm~doc/salingeramicusbrief.pdf. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 76 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006)). 
 160 Id. at 77–78. 
 161 eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. 
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manded the case to the district court to reassess whether an injunc-
tion would be appropriate under these circumstances.
162
  Unlike the 
Eleventh Circuit in Suntrust, the Second Circuit did not analyze the 
substance of Colting’s fair use defense.  Rather, in one paragraph, the 
Second Circuit determined that the district court’s finding that Colt-
ing would not succeed in his defense was not clear error, and there-
fore would not be disturbed.
163
  On remand, the parties entered a 
confidential settlement agreement, which resulted in a permanent 
injunction forbidding Colting “from manufacturing, publishing, dis-
tributing, shipping, advertising, promoting, selling, or otherwise dis-
seminating any copy of the book 60 Years Later . . . in or to the United 
States.”
164
  The result in Salinger, perhaps more than the result in Sun-
trust, demonstrates the importance of district court opinions in this 
context, and highlights the uncertainty literary parodists face. 
District courts must often walk a fine line between protecting the 
economic interests of authors of fictional novels and protecting the 
First Amendment interests of authors of parodies or sequels.  Al-
though cases of unauthorized literary sequels are not litigated fre-
quently, they do illustrate the difficulty district courts face in applying 
the fair use factors to this form of expression.  Further, a possibility 
exists “that the risk of being held an infringer is deterring rewritings 
of texts that are still copyrighted and is steering authors to set their 
revisionary sights instead on public domain works.”
165
  Allowing the 
potential for litigation to deter creation produces a result irreconcil-
able with one of the goals Congress envisioned in codifying the Copy-
right Act. 
Both Suntrust and Salinger demonstrate the difficulty that district 
courts face when confronted with the problem of fair use in parodic 
sequels.  Because of the uncertainty in how a court will apply the fac-
tors in a given case, creators of parodic literary sequels may think 
twice before devoting the time and effort to a project that readers 
may never see.  Ultimately, decisions such as Suntrust and Salinger may 
serve to chill the creation of such parodies or commentaries, which 
thwarts Congress’s intention to promote artistic endeavors by enact-
ing the Copyright Act.
166
  The frequently subjective nature of the fair 
use factors gives district courts the ability to tailor the analysis to the 
 
 162 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83. 
 163 Id. at 83. 
 164 Judgment on Consent at 1, Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (No. 09 Civ. 5095).  
 165 Note, Originality, 115  HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1994 (2002).   
 166 See, e.g., Warnken Van Hecke, supra note 71. 
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particular case at issue.  But this subjectivity also gives district courts 
tremendous discretion to determine whether an author has fairly 
used material to create a parody or whether he or she should be held 
liable for copyright infringement.  As the Eleventh Circuit has ex-
plained, “The law grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly in 
their expressive works.  It should not also afford them windfall dam-
ages for the publication of the sorts of works that they themselves 
would never publish, or worse, grant them a power of indirect cen-
sorship.”
167
  District court judges are not literary critics.  Yet a careful 
reading of both Suntrust and Salinger demonstrates the ease with 
which a reasoned application of the fair use factors can lead to an as-
sessment of the quality of the literary work being analyzed.  Not all 
cases will make their way to the circuit courts.  While defendants in 
cases like Suntrust may have the merits of their cases reassessed on 
appeal, not all defendants have this opportunity.
168
  Further, even 
those who do make their way to the circuit courts do so only after 
lengthy, expensive litigation for a final result that is far from cer-
tain.
169
  Rather than relying on circuit courts to resolve the discrepan-
cies among the district courts, the problem should be resolved at the 
district court level. 
VI. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM 
To more adequately protect the First Amendment rights of pa-
rodist-authors while still protecting the economic rights of original 
authors, district courts should implement three distinct, yet inter-
connected, changes to the fair use analysis.  First, the analysis of a li-
terary parody should begin with a presumption of fair use, which 
would shift the burden to the original author to disprove fair use in 
cases of parody.  Second, district courts should standardize their ap-
plication of the fair use factors by focusing their analysis on fair use 
factor four—the market effect of derivative works on the original.  
Finally, before issuing injunctive relief in cases of literary parody, dis-
 
 167 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 168 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that on appeal, the Salinger court opted 
not to interfere with the district court’s fair use analysis.  See Salinger v. Colting, 607 
F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 169 Litigating copyright issues may also be more costly than bringing many other 
types of suits because of the possibility for fee-shifting and attorney’s fees allowed by 
the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).  “In any civil action under this title, 
the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party 
other than the United States or an officer thereof.  Except as otherwise provided by 
this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party 
as part of the costs.”  Id. 
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trict courts should engage in a more stringent analysis of the effects 
of allowing the parody to be distributed; this more stringent test 
would ensure that parodist-authors’ free speech rights are not being 
unduly restrained. 
A. Presumption of Fair Use 
A presumption of fair use in cases of parody furthers the original 
goals of copyright law while still serving to protect the First Amend-
ment rights of parodists.  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in its Suntrust 
decision, the three main goals of copyright law are (1) the promotion 
of learning, (2) the protection of the public domain, and (3) the 
granting of an exclusive right to the author.
170
  The court explained 
that copyright law promotes learning by “guarding against censor-
ship” and encouraging the dissemination of ideas.
171
  Similarly, the 
protection of the public domain ensures that the public will eventual-
ly have access to and will be able to use others’ creations in novel and 
important ways,
172
 while allowing an author a copyright over a work 
gives the author a right to exclusively use the work for a limited pe-
riod of time.
173
  Presuming fair use in cases of parody protects all of 
these goals while still ensuring the protection of others’ First 
Amendment rights. 
One argument against the current statutory treatment of copy-
right is the term for which the author or artist owns the right.  Copy-
rights were originally intended to be limited economic monopolies, 
but owners of copyrights are now given these monopolies for a fairly 
extensive period of time.  The first Copyright Act (of 1790) used the 
Statute of Anne’s fourteen-year copyright period and allowed for 
another fourteen-year renewal.
174
  By contrast, the Copyright Act of 
1976 extended the copyright period to the life of the author plus fifty 
years.
175
  Congress further extended the period in 1998 to the life of 
 
 170 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1261–62.  
 171 Id. at 1261. 
 172 Id. at 1262. 
 173 Id. at 1262–63. 
 174 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/history/1790act.pdf (“[T]he author and authors of any 
map, chart, book or books already printed within these United States . . . shall have 
the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map, 
chart, book or books, for the term of fourteen years from the recording the title the-
reof in the clerk’s office . . . .”). 
 175 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1998). 
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the author plus seventy years.
176
 Presuming fair use in cases of parody 
can alleviate the free speech impediments put in place by the lengthy 
term of ownership.  Essentially, rather than requiring a creator of a 
transformative derivative work to assert “fair use” as a defense, a copy-
right owner would be required to disprove fair use.
177
  This presents 
less of a burden to creators of transformative works and furthers the 
intention that copyright be a limited economic right.
178
  Although 
some court decisions have emphasized that a finding of parody 
should not be construed as presumptive fair use,
179
 such a determina-
tion would eliminate much of the subjective analysis courts currently 
engage in when assessing how much use is “fair.”  Some scholars have 
even gone so far as to advocate a presumption of fair use in all cases 
of transformation.
180
 
Similarly, presumptive fair use for parodies furthers the inten-
tion of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause that copyright “pro-
mote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”
181
 or as the Eleventh 
Circuit explained, encourages protection of the public domain.
182
  
Copyright-holders are still given the economic incentive to produce 
original, creative works because they can still obtain copyrights over 
their novels, bring suit against those who have infringed on their 
originals, and choose to award licenses to and be paid by those who 
want to use their original material.  Allowing parodists the privilege 
of a presumption of fair use, however, will also serve to promote 
 
 176 Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 302(a) (2006) (amending the duration of copyright period)); see also Murphy, su-
pra note 15, at 572. 
 177 See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1271, 1311 (2008); Maureen McCrann, Note, A Modest Proposal: Granting Presumptive 
Fair Use for Musical Parodies, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 96, 101–02 (2009). 
 178 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) 
(“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store 
of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”). 
 179 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994) (“Like a book 
review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may or may not be fair 
use, and petitioners’ suggestion that any parodic use is presumptively fair has no 
more justification in law or fact than the equally hopeful claim that any use for news 
reporting should be presumed fair.”); Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 
1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The fact that parody by definition must borrow ele-
ments from an existing work, however, does not mean that every parody is shielded 
from a claim of copyright infringement as a fair use.”). 
 180 See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 177, at 1311 (“Put another way, in cases involving 
transformative uses, the cost of fair use false positives is less than the cost of false 
negatives, insofar as the latter threaten to undermine important free-speech val-
ues.”).  
 181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 182 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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progress in the arts by conveying some measure of stability to parod-
ists seeking to legitimately contribute critical commentary of the orig-
inal.  By presuming that parodies entail fair use, courts will no longer 
easily engage in ad hoc decision-making; it will be more difficult to 
manipulate the classification of whether or not a given work consti-
tutes parody in order to reach a finding of infringement or fair use.
183
  
For this reason, a presumption of fair use will further another of cop-
yright’s intended goals: stimulating public debate with creative ex-
pression.
184
 
Presumptive fair use also serves to promote learning and more 
fully protect a parodist’s First Amendment rights.  One important 
function of the First Amendment is to allow citizens to contribute to 
the “marketplace of ideas.”
185
  Presuming fair use in the case of paro-
dies solves the potential problem of stifled public debate.
186
  Parodies 
are particularly vulnerable to censorship because those being paro-
died have the ability to do the censoring.  Because parodies often cri-
ticize or comment negatively on the original work, authors are not 
likely to approve the use of their original material.
187
  Even criticism 
 
 183 See Paul Tager Lehr, Note, The Fair-Use Doctrine Before and After “Pretty Woman’s” 
Unworkable Framework: The Adjustable Tool for Censoring Distasteful Parody, 46 FLA. L. REV. 
443, 460 (1994) (“While the Copyright Act is content neutral, the cases reveal that 
courts have used the discretion inherent in the fair-use framework to deny protection 
to sexually explicit or distasteful parodies.”). 
 184 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
The ‘promotion of science and the useful arts’ requires this limit on 
the scope of an author’s control.  Were an author able to prevent sub-
sequent authors from using concepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or 
her work, the creative process would wither and scholars would be 
forced into unproductive replication of the research of their predeces-
sors.  This limitation on copyright also ensures consonance with our 
most important First Amendment values.   
Id. (citation omitted). 
 185 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“By 
protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government attack, 
the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.”). 
 186 See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Ko-
sinski, C.J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment isn’t just about religion or politics—
it’s also about protecting the free development of our national culture.  Parody, hu-
mor, irreverence are all vital components of the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 187 See Geri J. Yonover, Artistic Parody: The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, 
and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 103–04 (1996). 
To obtain permission from an artist who may assert personal, moral 
rights would seem to be virtually impossible.  Further, we may well 
wonder how parody could function effectively as commentary and cri-
tique if the authority to satirize, criticize, ridicule, or jibe is given.  
Permission connotes approval—few parodists wish that blessing, and 
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or negative commentary, however, contributes to the public debate 
and allows the parodist to express himself or herself creatively.  As 
one scholar notes, “With the recent copyright term extension, one 
wonders how many more canonical works will be shielded by long 
copyright terms, and how many rewritings will not be produced be-
cause authors cannot get permission to create them.”
188
  By the time 
the copyright period has expired and the original passes into the 
public domain, relevant commentary or critique may also have ex-
pired.  Parodists should not be discriminated against because of the 
form of critique they have chosen to use; censorship of critical com-
mentary in scholarly journals or news articles is not so prevalent.
189
  
“Fair use, therefore, provides a valuable right to those compelled to 
challenge a prior work—the right to make reasonable use of the work 
in their criticism.”
190
 
Presuming fair use in cases of parody, perhaps along with allow-
ing works to enter the public domain more quickly by reducing the 
statutory period of copyright protection, will ultimately benefit would-
be parodists.  As scholars have noted, “[T]he public domain provides 
the building blocks from which individuals can construct their own 
speech.  But as the scope of intellectual property expands, the scope 
of available speech diminishes.”
191
  Granting a presumption of fair 
use, however, does not completely solve the problem of inconsistent 
application of the fair use factors.  A presumption of fair use does not 
equate to automatic determination of fair use; courts will still be re-
quired to analyze the transformed work in the context of the fair use 
factors when the copyright-holder attempts to rebut the presump-
 
few artists whose moral rights of integrity are at risk would wish that 
curse. 
Id.   
 188 Note, Originality, supra note 165, at 1994.   
 189 See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).  
A key distinction that has emerged in the decisions evaluating the 
second factor [of fair use] is whether the work is expressive or creative, 
such as a work of fiction, or more factual, with a greater leeway being 
allowed to a claim of fair use where the work is factual or information-
al. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190 Jeffrey D. Grossett, Comment, The Wind Done Gone: Transforming Tara into a 
Plantation Parody, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2002). 
 191 John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Inter-
mediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2005). 
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tion.
192
  Thus, although a presumption of fair use might help to alle-
viate the problem, it does not completely resolve it. 
B. Standardization of Factor Application 
If parodies were presumed to be fair use, a copyright-holder 
would have the burden of demonstrating why the use was actually an 
infringement.  In their analyses of these arguments, courts would 
then be required to engage in traditional fair use analysis by applying 
the statute’s four factors.  To remedy the confusion and uncertainty 
associated with application of the fair use factors, however, district 
courts should instead use more clear-cut, bright-line rules in their 
application of the factors.  One possibility for how courts may achieve 
a more definitive, predictable result is to collapse the factor analysis 
into a discussion of how a derivative work affects the market for the 
original or the market for derivative works created or authorized by 
the original author—fair use factor four.  Collapsing the four-factor 
test into one factor eliminates much of the subjective analysis that 
makes court determinations of fair use so unpredictable, but it also 
still promotes the three major goals of copyright law as discussed by 
the Eleventh Circuit in Suntrust. 
Because copyright law in the United States is largely concerned 
with providing an author or artist with a limited economic monopoly 
over his or her creation, analyzing the market effects of a derivative 
work seems like a logical starting place.
193
  If a derivative work is likely 
to serve the same market as an original and may be viewed as a mar-
ket substitute for that original, a fair use defense will likely fail; argu-
ably, one major goal of copyright law is to prevent such direct en-
croachment upon an author’s market for his work.  Thus, relying 
solely on the market factor adequately protects authors’ economic in-
terests, one of the major purposes of copyright. 
Some scholars see this market-based test as a way to analyze more 
objectively the extent of transformation in a derivative work com-
pared to the original.
194
  When two works are substantially similar, 
they are likely to serve similar markets and act as substitutes for one 
another.  If the works are serving different markets, the derivative 
work is more likely transformative in character.  “Thus, the market 
analysis balances incentives for authors to create against the public’s 
 
 192 See Andrew S. Long, Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing Copy-
right to Promote the First Amendment Values of Transformative Video, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 317, 
363 (2007).   
 193 See Topper Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 250. 
 194 See, e.g., Warnken Van Hecke, supra note 71, at 494.   
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desire for intellectual enrichment.”
195
  In cases of parody, the new 
work is unlikely to serve the same market as the original because the 
works effectively have different goals.  Even in situations in which the 
market for an original and the market for a parody are the same, the 
parody is unlikely to become a market substitute for the original.  In 
other words, people will not likely opt to purchase a parody over the 
original work.
196
  Therefore, relying on an analysis of the economic 
effect of a derivative work on the original will also serve the two other 
goals of copyright—promoting learning and protecting the public 
domain. 
C. A More Stringent Test for Administering Injunctive Relief 
A major point of contention for defendants in copyright in-
fringement suits is the standard for injunctive relief applied by the 
district court.  In Salinger, briefs written in support of the defendant’s 
appeal emphasize the short shrift given to the defendant’s First 
Amendment rights and the presumption of irreparable harm applied 
to the plaintiff.
197
  Applying a more stringent test for issuing injunc-
tions in copyright suits involving parodies, more specifically in cases 
of parodic literary sequels, would also serve to protect the three fun-
damental goals of copyright that the Eleventh Circuit highlighted in 
Suntrust: the promotion of learning, the protection of the public do-
main, and the protection of the exclusive rights of the author.
198
 
Employing a stricter standard for issuing injunctions serves to 
promote learning by permitting a greater number of transformative, 
creative works to be shared and discussed.  This ultimately prevents 
“censorship” by requiring district courts to thoroughly consider how 
injunctive relief for a copyright-holder may affect a parodist’s contri-
bution to the public debate.  In awarding injunctive relief to bar pub-
lication and distribution of an allegedly infringing work, courts 
should also consider the extent to which the public has the right to 
receive the information contained in the work or the work’s message.  
 
 195 Topper Gonzales, supra note 4, at 251. 
 196 One could argue that the creation of a parody might actually bolster the market 
for the original; especially in cases of literary parodies, a reader might have difficulty 
understanding the parody if he or she had not read the original already, which may 
cause the audience to go out and purchase the original novel. 
 197 See Brief of Public Citizen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellants at 14, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-7878), avail-
able at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Public%20Citizen%27s%20Amicus 
%20Brief.pdf; Brief of American Library Association, supra note 157, at 1–3. 
 198 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
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One fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act is to further the pub-
lic welfare; situations may exist in which the public welfare would be 
furthered by allowing a work to be published rather than hidden 
from public view forever—or at least until the copyright period ex-
pires.
199
  Raising the bar for injunctions helps protect the public do-
main by allowing works with a unique message or comment to be 
available for public response.  As Colting noted in his brief to the 
Second Circuit, the public should be able to decide whether a mes-
sage is worthwhile rather than let the message be preemptively 
shielded by a court’s injunction.
200
 
Raising the standard for injunctive relief in cases of parody also 
does not conflict with copyright’s goal of protecting the rights of an 
original author.  In some circumstances, especially in cases in which a 
parody becomes a market substitute for an original or contains out-
right piracy, injunctive relief may be appropriate to best protect the 
original author’s economic claim to his creation.  In most cases of pa-
rody, however, an original author will not suffer “irreparable harm” 
by a district court’s decision not to issue an injunction, so such irre-
parable harm should not be presumed.
201
  Requiring district courts 
analyzing parody cases to assess the balance of hardships and the im-
pact of an injunction on the public interest will also ensure that in 
addition to taking into consideration economic harm caused to the 
original author, the courts consider the effect of this remedy on oth-
ers involved.  Further, in some situations, monetary damages, rather 
than preventing the publication of a transformative comment on the 
 
 199 See Oakes, supra note 89, at 989–91. 
 200 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 156, at 32.   
The District Court did not even consider the harm to the public in be-
ing denied the opportunity to read [60 Years] and to decide for them-
selves whether Colting’s work adds to or alters their understanding of 
[Catcher], Holden and Salinger.  The harm to the public’s right to re-
ceive information, and even entertainment, is perhaps the most com-
pelling factor in weighing the balance of interests in a case of prior re-
straint.   
Id. 
 201 See, e.g., id. at 30–31. 
On the first prong, absent the presumption, there is no evidence in the 
record that Plaintiff will suffer any harm whatsoever, much less irrepar-
able harm, from the publication of [60 Years].  Plaintiff’s representa-
tives admit that Salinger has not written a sequel, and will never permit 
one either.  But even if Salinger were to change his mind, there is no 
evidence in the record that the market for an authorized sequel, a mo-
tion picture based on [Catcher] or any other authorized derivative work 
would be harmed in the slightest by Colting’s commentary.   
Id. (citation omitted). 
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original, can better protect an original author’s rights over his 
work.
202
  In such situations, monetary damages, rather than injunctive 
relief, should be awarded. 
The district court decision in Salinger highlights the danger in 
easing the standard for injunctive relief in copyright infringement 
cases.  The court devotes one paragraph to discussing the presumed 
irreparable harm that J.D. Salinger would face if 60 Years were al-
lowed to be published in the United States.  The court does not even 
mention the balance of equities or potential harm to the public in-
terest; perhaps if the district court had weighed these factors more 
closely, the outcome would have been different.
203
  Regardless of 
whether the outcome of the case would be different, requiring dis-
trict courts to assess the other balancing factors before issuing injunc-
tions would ensure that authors of unauthorized literary sequels have 
their original, transformative expression protected and that the pub-
lic is not deprived of a valuable critique or commentary.  District 
courts are guided by the standard for injunctive relief used in their 
respective circuits.  In cases of copyright infringement, different cir-
cuits will apply different standards for injunctive relief depending on 
whether or not they take a parodist’s First Amendment rights into 
consideration.
204
  This will ultimately cause great variation in the out-
comes of parody cases and great uncertainty for parodists. 
This uncertainty can be alleviated to a large degree by presum-
ing fair use in cases of parody, limiting subsequent fair use analysis to 
the parody’s effect on the market for the original or licensed deriva-
tive works, and heightening the standard used to issue preliminary 
injunctions in cases of parody.  These steps, when taken in conjunc-
tion, will more closely bring a court’s fair use analysis into an equita-
ble balance between two viable interests: the economic interests of a 
copyright-holder and the First Amendment interests of a literary pa-
rodist. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Since the early days of this country, copyright has been consi-
dered a necessary legal protection to safeguard the economic inter-
ests of authors and artists.  These rights, however, have never been 
 
 202 Id. at 31 (“[I]f this Court were to find that Plaintiff has shown harm, such harm 
may be remedied by monetary damages and therefore is not irreparable.”). 
 203 See Brief of American Library Association, supra note 157, at 4. 
 204 See generally Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 
2001) (highlighting First Amendment concerns in overturning an injunction issued 
by the district court); Tehranian, supra note 191, at 1226. 
RADIGAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  3:05 PM 
1200 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1169 
absolute.  Early on, courts recognized that society’s need for free de-
bate should require that some appropriation of another’s work be 
considered fair use.  Although Congress eventually codified this “fair 
use” doctrine, courts retained their authority to use discretion in con-
sidering which factors should be important to determine fair use and 
how heavily courts should weigh each of those factors. 
Parody is one vehicle through which an author has the ability to 
fairly use another’s work to make a critical commentary.  Authors or 
other creators of original works, however, frequently bring copyright 
infringement suits against their parodists, claiming that the parodist 
appropriated too much of the author’s original creation.  Courts are 
then required to balance the interests of the two parties, but in doing 
so they may be forced to tacitly assess whether or not the parody was 
successful in conveying its message or if it was of good quality.  De-
pending on the form the parody took, as in a novel, a piece of visual 
art, or a musical work, the court may engage in either a quantitative 
or a qualitative analysis to determine whether the use was fair.  In 
doing so, the court is forced to balance two sets of competing rights: 
those of the original creator and those of the parodist. 
This balancing act frequently calls into question which rights 
should prevail, and the stakes are high for the parties involved.  Be-
cause copyright holders have a statutory right to request injunctive 
relief, a parodist may unfortunately realize that a work he or she had 
put time, effort, and money into may no longer be distributed to the 
public.  This problem is most evident in cases of literary parodies, 
where the court, to resolve the dispute before it, is left to parse the 
language carefully selected by two authors, trying to determine the 
extent of overlap and whether the parody unduly infringes on the 
original.  The current formulation of the fair use test gives judges this 
freedom to weigh these issues, but this flexibility comes at the ex-
pense of certainty. 
In Justice Story’s words, “No man writes exclusively from his own 
thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others.  The 
thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other 
men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified, 
exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.”
205
  The ques-
tion that must be answered is whether district courts, and courts in 
general, are the appropriate bodies to analyze this “genius or reflec-
tion.”  As is evidenced in both Suntrust and Salinger, one man’s crea-
tivity is another man’s copyright infringement.  In applying the cur-
 
 205 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).   
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rent fair use analysis, courts are put in the unsavory position of ana-
lyzing literature; similarly, authors of these unauthorized derivative 
novels are put in the unsettling position of devoting time and energy 
to an arguably original creation without knowing if it can ever be 
published.  Although fair use analysis is designed to be flexible in ap-
plication, this flexibility may ultimately serve to chill the production 
of artistic creation it was designed to promote.  A combination of a 
presumption of fair use in cases of parody, standardization of the fair 
use factors based upon the market effect of the derivative, and a 
more rigorous standard for issuing injunctive relief in copyright cases 
would improve the protection of a parodist-author’s First Amend-
ment rights.  Further, the combination of these changes would still 
protect the copyright-holder’s economic rights.  Instead of being a 
complete monopoly over the material, however, the monopoly would 
be limited, as originally intended. 
 
